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Abstract
This paper examines the interaction between altruism towards off-
spring and precautionary savings. It investigates whether increased
uncertainty in children labor income fosters savings of parents. We
first construct a two-periods and two-generations model, to underline
which are the mechanisms behind the intergenerational precaution-
ary motive for savings. Second, we exploit two micro datasets to test
the main theoretical implications. Parents’ consumption turns out
to respond to the offspring’s income risk. This result is robust to the
presence of family fixed effects and to many alternative empirical spec-
ifications.
Jel codes: D13; D15; C23.
Keywords: precautionary savings, consumption, income risk, offspring.
1 Introduction
A wide strand of economic literature anlysed consumption and saving choices,
and identified several broad reasons why individuals decide to save part of
their resources (see Lusardi, 1997; Attanasio and Weber, 2010, for two im-
pressive reviews of the literature on this topic). The standard life cycle and
permanent income models of individual behaviour (Modigliani and Brum-
berg, 1954, 1980; Friedman, 1957), in which households are endowed with a
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concave utility function, posits a strong incentive for intertemporal smooth-
ing of income changes. Individuals save when income is relatively high –
namely, when current income is higher than its permanent level – in order to
consume more than current income when it shrinks. The second motive for
saving is to cope with uncertainty. Uncertainty leads risk-averse and prudent
individuals to save more than the amount predicted by the baseline life-cycle
model. The economic literature defines this motive “precautionary saving",
that is the additional savings due to the possible uncertainty about the future
which is impossible or too costly to insure against (Lusardi, 1997; Carroll and
Samwick, 1998; Mastrogiacomo and Alessie, 2014).1 A third motive for sav-
ing is altruism. Individuals may want to accumulate additional wealth over
their life-cycle in order to transfer financial resources to other individuals
(De Nardi, 2004; De Nardi and Yang, 2014). Even in absence of uncertainty
about the future, bequest motives are, then, a reason why individuals leave
positive net wealth at the end of their life and/or save and transfer resources
to the offspring over the entire life-cycle (McGarry, 2016).
While these reasons for saving have been extensively investigated by the
literature, much less attention has been devoted to the interaction among
them.2 This paper contributes to closing this gap by analyzing the interaction
between altruism towards offspring and precautionary savings. We examine
whether increased uncertainty in children’s labor income fosters saving by
parents, and determine an intergenerational precautionary motive for saving.
This channel is at work under two main assumptions: households must save
for precautionary motives, and they must care about offspring and save for
altruistic motives.
We develop a stylized theoretical framework to point out the economic
rationale behind the intergenerational precautionary motive for saving. We
show that in a two-periods two-generations model, the amount of parents’
savings depend positively on offspring’s income uncertainty and negatively
on offspring’s expected income. We allow the results to change according to
the relative weight that parents attach to offspring’s cash-on-hand. Differ-
ent weights can be due to different family ties and altruism. The model is
also able to account for the heterogenous generosity and efficacy of welfare
programs, incorporated in a lower variability of disposable income.
Testing the main predictions of the theoretical model requires informa-
1Uncertainty can refer to negative income shocks/unemployment spells or unexpected
increase in expenditures, such as medical expenditure (De Nardi, French, and Jones, 2010).
Moreover, uncertain of death leads individuals to die with a positive net wealth, the so-
called unintended bequest.
2Boar (2017) represents a notable exception. In this unpublished paper, she examines
the importance of dynastic precautionary savings in the US.
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tion about parental consumption and saving, along with offspring’s income
risk. To this purpose, we combine two cross-country data sources, which
cover a period of about a decade. First, we use the Survey of Health, Ageing
and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) to gather information about parents’
generation. This longitudinal panel dataset on European individuals older
than 50 years collects several socio-economic variables, notably information
on household consumption and on family composition, including a set of
characteristics of each child. The second data source is the European Union
Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC). It provides micro-
data on income, and it is used to construct an exogenous measure for income
risk faced by the offspring generation. More precisely, we rely on two indices
for income risk, which measure, respectively, income and unemployment risk
within the same ‘type’ of individuals. Individual ‘type’ is identified by age,
gender, education level, year and country of residence. The first indicator
is the dispersion of the unexplained component of income; the second one
is the probability of unemployment. Combining these two data sources, we
are able to match each adult child of individuals interviewed in SHARE to
her own indicator for income risk. The longitudinal dimension of the dataset
allows to control for unobservable time-invariant characteristics, including
country of residence and family composition, along with time fixed effect.
Therefore, identification of the effect of offspring’s income risk on parental
consumption exploits the heterogeneity in the evolution of uncertainty faced
by different ‘types’ of children over time (within the same country). Esti-
mate results show a significant impact of offspring’s income uncertainty on
parental consumption: One standard deviation increase in offspring’s income
risk determine a contraction by 1% in parental consumption.
This paper is related to two strands of literature. First, it contributes to
the analysis of the determinants of consumption and saving over the life-cycle,
by investigating a new channel, namely whether precautionary saving and al-
truistic motives interact, and determine an intergenerational precautionary
motive for saving. In this respect, it relates to the wide literature examining
precautionary savings. Starting from the seminal papers by Kimball (1990)
and Caballero (1991), some recent examples are Meghir and Pistaferri (2004)
and Low, Meghir, and Pistaferri (2010). Moreover, this paper adds to the
literature analyzing the role of intergenerational transfers – in the form of
either inter vivos transfers or bequest – to shape consumption and saving
choices. In the theoretical framework, we rely on a model with altruism,
where individuals deprive themselves of some of their resources to transfers
them to their heirs. This altruistic motive for savings has been shown to be
relevant in driving consumption, especially for the wealthier (De Nardi, 2004;
De Nardi and Yang, 2014; McGarry, 2016). Second, this paper contributes to
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the literature analyzing the insurance role of the family. The recent contribu-
tion by Blundell, Pistaferri, and Saporta-Eksten (2016) examines insurance
within two earners households, and highlights the role of family labor sup-
ply as a smoothing device against (persistent) income shocks. Attanasio,
Meghir, and Mommaerts (2015) illustrate the extent to which idiosyncratic
shocks to household income are insured within the extended family. More in
general, there is evidence supporting an effect of shocks on behavior not only
of spouses, but also of other family members. This link relates to several
margins, such as labor supply (Baldini, Torricelli, and Brancati, 2018) and
transfers (McGarry, 2016). In addition, Kaplan (2012) demonstrates that
the option to move in and out of the parental home is a valuable insurance
channel against labor market risk.
The closest paper to our work is the unpublished paper by Boar (2017).
We depart from her approach along several dimensions. First, she relies on
permanent income uncertainty, defined as the standard deviation of the fore-
cast error of lifetime earnings, which hinges on strong assumptions about
the way individuals form their expectations about future income. Moreover,
identification in Boar (2017) is based on differences in uncertainty across age
and sector (notably, the latter is a choice variable, potentially related to other
individual characteristics), and does not allow for unobserved heterogeneity.
Our approach and identification strategy exploit variation in income risk
within groups identified by less problematic variables and, more importantly,
it does not impose any restriction between unobserved individual character-
istics and the explanatory variables.
Three main reasons motivate the analysis of this issue from a cross-
country perspective. First, it is well known that social norms and family
ties may differ across countries. Offspring typically rely on parents’ resources
more extensively and for a longer period in Mediterranean countries than in
Nordic countries (Albertini, Kohli, and Vogel, 2007). In Southern European
economies, extended household is often considered as a substitute for welfare
policies targeted to youth, such as labor market and childcare public inter-
ventions. The direction of causality between the strong family ties and the
weak welfare state is, however, still debated. Second, labor market segmen-
tation makes young generations relatively more exposed to income shocks
in Mediterranean countries than in Nordic countries. In the former, labour
market’s reforms in the last two decades shifted the burden of uncertainty
disproportionately on the young generations, increasing inter-generational
inequality. In addition, retirees in Southern European countries receive rela-
tively generous public pension benefits with respect to young’s wages, which
further increases the gap in resources across generations. The combination
of the greater uncertainty about offspring’s income and the lower availability
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of labor market instruments to face uncertainty may increase parents’ sav-
ing in Mediterranean countries. Moreover, weaker labor market institutions
may strengthen the precautionary motive for saving. This channel may con-
tribute to explain high savings in Mediterranean countries (Attias-Donfut,
Ogg, and Wolff, 2005). Third, understanding cross-country differences in the
way households’ savings react to an increase of perceived uncertainty in off-
spring’s labor income has relevant policy implications. Almost a decade of
stagnation and crises asymmetrically affected the economic systems within
the European Union. Shedding light on this channel and its heterogeneity
across Europe may be useful to evaluate spill-over of labor market features
on savings and, in turn, to implement policies targeted to savings.
2 The theoretical framework
The present section illustrates the theoretical setting of our analysis and
points out the economic relation between parental choices and offspring’s
income uncertainty. We build a simple theoretical model with two gener-
ations (parents and offspring) living for two periods, and we focus on the
consumption/saving decision of parents, who derive some utility from their
own consumption and from cash-on-hand of their offspring.
Utility function. All the individuals in the generation of parents maximize
the following utility function:
U1,yt = u
(
c1,yt
)
+ Et u
(
c1,ot+1
)
+ αEt u
(
w2,yt+1
)
(1)
where c is consumption and w is cash-on-hand, namely the sum of income and
transfers received by the young in period 2. The subscripts t and t + 1 rep-
resent present and future periods, the superscripts 1 and 2 indicates parents
and offspring, and the superscripts y and o indicates whether the generation
is young or old, respectively. According to this additively separable utility
function, the total utility at present (time t) of parents (generation 1) when
they are young (y) is the sum of the utility from their own contemporary con-
sumption u
(
c1,yt
)
, their expected utility from future consumption Et u
(
c1,ot+1
)
(that is, the utility from consumption of the same generation 1 when old o
in t + 1), and the additional term, αEt u
(
w2,yt+1
)
. The latter is the expected
value at time t of the utility from the cash-on-hand of the offspring gener-
ation when young (2, y) in the period t + 1 (Et u
(
w2,yt+1
)
), weighted by α,
which represents the relative weight given by parents to the wealth of their
offspring. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the intertemporal rate
of time preferences and the real interest rate on the only risk-free asset are
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both equal to zero.
The utility function in equation 1 implies that the choice between consump-
tion and saving of the offspring generation does not affect the utility of the
parents generation. Stated differently, what matters for the parents is the
amount of cash-on-hand of the offspring at the beginning of their life-cycle,
while they are indifferent regarding their allocation of resources over time.
Constraints. In every period each individual earns some income y, that
must be devoted either to consumption c or to savings s. Savings of the
elderly (parents in period t + 1) are transferred to the next generation.3
Since we are interested in choices of parents generation, we do not model
consumption choices of the offspring here. In general, the arguments of the
utility function in equation (1) can then be stated as
c1,yt = y
1,y
t − s1,yt (2a)
c1,ot+1 = y
1,o
t+1 + s
1,y
t − s1,ot+1 (2b)
w2,yt+1 = y
2,y
t+1 + s
1,o
t+1 (2c)
where y1,yt includes also possible transfers from the previous generation.4
Consumption of generation 1 when old in (2b) is equal to the current in-
come and savings in previous period (s1,yt ) minus the transfers to the next
generation (s1,ot+1). In the following, we assume that s
1,o
t+1 is non-negative,
since parents cannot freely dispose of offspring income and cannot decide to
increase their own consumption by means of offspring income.
Income process and utility function. Income realization in t+ 1 is un-
certain. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that income of both generations
follows a normal distributions:
y1,ot+1 ∼ N
(
y¯1,o, σ2 1,o
)
(3)
and
y2,yt+1 ∼ N
(
y¯2,y, σ2 2,y
)
(4)
3All the conclusions of the model are independent of the fact that such transfers are
intra-vivos or bequests, and the same is true for the empirical analysis. Indeed, we focus
on the savings decision of the elderly, irrespective on whether they are actually transferred
to offspring.
4In principle, one could explicitly separate the two components in the proper income
y1,yt and the transfer received by the previous generation 0, s
0,o
t . However, since they are
both exogenous, the present notation is equivalent, but simpler.
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where y¯ are the means and σ2 the variances. Correlation between the two
income processes is not restricted: They can be either perfectly correlated
(‘systemic’ shock that affects all the individuals), or perfectly uncorrelated
(idiosyncratic shocks), or any intermediate case.
We assume that utility of consumption is exponential, that is u (c) =
1−e−kc
k
. The exponential utility function is quite tractable, and enjoys the
property of convex marginal utility function, which determines a precaution-
ary motive for saving (Kimball, 1990). Absolute prudence is constant and
equal to the parameter k.5
Maximization problem. Within the framework described above, in pe-
riod t the representative member of generation 1 chooses the levels of con-
sumption that maximize the following utility function:
U1,yt =
1− e−kc1,yt
k
+ Et
1− e−kc1,ot+1
k
+ αEt
1− e−kw2,yt+1
k
(5)
subject to the constraints in (2a), (2b), (2c). Substituting the constraints
into (5), and exploiting properties of exponential functions and of log-normal
distribution,6 we obtain the first order conditions:
∂U1,yt
∂s1,yt
=− e−k(y1,yt −s1,yt ) + e−k(y¯1,o− k2σ2 1,o+s1,yt −s1,ot+1) = 0 (6a)
∂U1,yt
∂s1,ot+1
=− e−k(y¯1,o− k2σ2 1,o+s1,yt −s1,ot+1) + αe−k(y¯2,y− k2σ2 2,y+s1,ot+1) = 0 (6b)
that can be more effectively summarized as
e−k(y
1,y
t −s1,yt ) = e−k(y¯
1,o− k
2
σ2 1,o+s1,yt −s1,ot+1) = αe−k(y¯
2,y− k
2
σ2 2,y+s1,ot+1) (7)
that is equivalent to the more general
u′
(
c1,yt
)
= Et u′
(
c1,ot+1
)
= αEt u′
(
w2,yt+1
)
. (8)
Results. The Euler conditions in (7) and (8) imply that individuals fully
smooth their expected consumption between t and t+1. Moreover, marginal
utility of parents’ consumption optimally equalize the expected marginal util-
ity from the cash-on-hand of the offspring, namely the young generation in
5The same qualitative conclusions of the model can be drawn by assuming a logarithmic
utility function of the form u (c) = ln (c) with decreasing prudence.
6According to which E e−kx = e−kx¯+k2 σ
2
2 if x ∼ N (x¯, σ2)
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t + 1, discounted by α. In the special case of α = 0 (parents do not derive
any utility from the utility of their offspring) this leads to the very standard
consumption smoothing solution in a two-periods, one-generation framework.
Solving the Euler conditions (all details in Appendix B) leads to the
following optimal saving behavior at time t
s1,yt =
2
3
y1,yt −
1
3
y¯1,o +
k
6
σ2 1,o − 1
3
y¯2,y +
k
6
σ2 2,y +
1
3
lnα
k
(9)
that shows some interesting features: i) saving is increasing with present
known income and decreasing with the expected value of the future uncertain
incomes; ii) holding constant the expected incomes, it is increasing with the
variance of future income; iii) the sensitivity of saving to income uncertainty
increases with k, that is the parameter of prudence; iv) the saving depends
positively on the relative weight given to offspring utility, α.
Expected saving in t + 1, that is the final transfer from generation 1 to
the next generation 2, is the following
s1,ot+1 =
1
3
y1,yt +
1
3
y¯1,o − k
6
σ2 1,o − 2
3
y¯2,y +
k
3
σ2 2,y +
2
3
lnα
k
(10)
and also gives interesting insights: i) the transfer is increasing with income of
generation 1 and decreasing with income of generation 2; ii) it increases with
the variance of income of generation 2, but is decreasing with the variance of
income of generation 1; iii) the sensitivity of saving to uncertainty of future
incomes increases with the parameter of prudence, k; iv) the transfer depends
positively on how altruistic are parents, α.
Finally, the consumption profile determined by the saving decisions of
parents is the following
c1,yt =
1
3
(
y1,yt + y¯
1,o + y¯2,y
)− k
6
σ2 1,o − k
6
σ2 2,y − 1
3
lnα
k
(11a)
c1,ot+1 =
1
3
(
y1,yt + y¯
1,o + y¯2,y
)
+
k
3
σ2 1,o − k
6
σ2 2,y − 1
3
lnα
k
(11b)
w2,yt+1 =
1
3
(
y1,yt + y¯
1,o + y¯2,y
)− k
6
σ2 1,o +
k
3
σ2 2,y +
2
3
lnα
k
(11c)
showing that expected parents’ consumption and offspring’s cash-on-hand is
equal to the average of total incomes, corrected for the level of uncertainty of
income (that in turn depends on the coefficient of prudence, k) and for the
degree of altruism, α. In detail, an increase of uncertainty on future income
leads the parents to consume less in period t, but to increase own future
consumption or transfers to the next generation in t+ 1. Indeed, in order to
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smooth the expected marginal utility from consumption/cash-on-hand, they
need to lower actual consumption and raise future expected consumption,
even if the expected income is unchanged. For instance, holding constant
the income profile, an increase in uncertainty of future own income, σ2 1,o,
leads to a proportional reduction of consumption in t and of transfers to
the offspring, w2,yt+1. Stated differently, since uncertainty affects the level of
expected utility, the consumption/transfer path react to change of variance
even if the expected income does not change.
In the following empirical analysis we test the main prediction of the
model, that is the negative correlation between income uncertainty and con-
sumption in (11a).
3 Empirical strategy
To test whether parents respond to offspring’s income uncertainty, we employ
a first difference estimator as in the following equation
∆ log cpt = γ∆σot + ζ∆σpt + ∆X
′
otβo + ∆X
′
ptβp + δtdt + ∆εpt (12)
where subscripts p and o denotes parent and offspring generations, respec-
tively, and t is the time period. The dependent variable ∆ log cpt is the change
in the logarithm of food consumption of parents, namely their consumption
growth rate. The main coefficient of interest is γ, which captures the response
of parental consumption to a change in offspring’s income risk (σot). Other
control variables are change in parental risk, ∆σpt, chenges in parental family
variables (∆X ′pt), which incorporates socio-economic covariates and the log-
arithm of parental income, and change in child’s characteristics ∆X ′ot, which
include the logarithm of imputed income and offspring’s socio-economic fea-
tures.7 Time-invariant characteristics, both observable and unobservable,
are differentiated out and their impact cannot be identified in this setting.
We include time dummies,8 and εpt is the usual idiosyncratic error term. In
the baseline specification we rely on information about the oldest child to
measure characteristics of the offspring.
7More precisely, the baseline specification X ′pt includes the following variables: log of
parental income, a dummy capturing whether the respondent is married or cohabiting with
a partner, and respondent’s job status, described by two dummy indicators for unemploy-
ment and retirement. Offspring’s covariates (X ′ot) include child’s job status, namely three
indicators capturing whether she is in full time or part-time work or unemployed, and her
log of income, which is the log of the average predicted value for individuals of the same
type (recovered from EU-SILC data).
8Coefficients δt measure the joint effect of time and age, which are collinear in a first
difference framework.
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To estimate equation (12), we use the first-difference methodology: We
do not impose any restriction on the correlation between covariates and un-
observed heterogeneity. Unobserved heterogeneity in equation (12) includes
both country fixed effect, namely economic, cultural and institutional differ-
ences which are persistent over time, and child-parent characteristics which
are time invariant, such as intertemporal preferences and degree of altruism
of parents, ability and risk aversion of the offspring, and birth cohort.
Identification of the effect of offspring’s uncertainty on parental consump-
tion relies on heterogeneous dynamics in income risk, according to the “type"
of child. We exploit changes in risk between types to estimate the impact
of child’s risk net of individual and time fixed effects. These heterogeneous
patterns are illustrated in figures 1 and 2.
In Section 5 we present the results of the main specification and we discuss
its potential issues and how we deal with them. We also present several
robustness checks in Section 6.
4 Data
The empirical analysis is aimed to test the main theoretical prediction,
namely whether parents’ consumption behavior responds to offspring’s in-
come uncertainty. To this purpose, we exploit two data sources which al-
low to observe and link two generations. The core dataset is the Survey
of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE), which is a cross
country panel collecting detailed information on the parental generation.
Notably, the dataset collects information on children characteristics. The
second dataset is the European Union Statistics on Income and Living Con-
ditions (EU-SILC), which provides information about individual income in
several European countries. We use these data to compute two measures of
income risk for the offspring generation, which are described in detail later
in this section.9
SHARE. SHARE is a cross-national longitudinal survey representative of
the non-institutionalised European population aged 50 or more. We use five
waves of the survey: wave 1 (interview years 2004–2005), wave 2 (2006–2007),
wave 4 (2011–2012), wave 5 (2013) and wave 6 (2015).10 We select 17 Euro-
pean countries, which took part to SHARE and EU-SILC in the same year.
9All measure of monetary variables are expressed in euro 2005 in Germany, using PPP
indices provided by SHARE.
10Wave 3 (SHARELIFE) includes information non comparable to the other waves.
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The distribution of our sample over time and across countries is provided in
Table 1.
The survey gathers information about several socio-economic variables,
employment status, income, and household composition, either at personal
or at household level. In our analysis, family characteristics are measured by
covariates of the household respondent, namely the person who answers ques-
tions on household composition. A key set of variables to our analysis refer
to characteristics of offspring, either co-resident with the respondent or not.
More precisely, for every single child, SHARE provides socio-demographics
information such as gender, education level, marital status, household size
and composition, job status, living distance from parental residence.
Finally, respondents report their food consumption. The dependent vari-
able we use in the empirical analysis is the logarithm of food expenditure,
either at home or out. Despite the fact that food expenditure typically repre-
sents a large fraction of household budget, food can be thought as a necessity
good, whose consumption is difficult to adjust. In this line, unemployment
turns out to significantly cut small durables expenditure, rather than food
consumption (Browning and Crossley, 2009). Demand rigidity determines a
response of food consumption to uncertainty which is expected to be smaller
than total or non durable consumption. For this reason, we might expect
our estimate to be a lower bound for the impact of increasing uncertainty in
offspring’s income risk on total or non durable consumption. We also test
whether the intergenerational precautionary saving channel is stronger when
considering food consumed outside home only, whose expenditure is expected
to be less rigid.
EU-SILC. We exploit EU-SILC to retrieve information on offspring’s in-
come and to measure income risk. EU-SILC is a European cross-country
panel collected yearly and coordinated by Eurostat to provide comparabil-
ity across countries and over time. We rely on cross-sectional waves for the
period 2004-2015. We combine each wave in SHARE with two waves in EU-
SILC, namely the two years when the SHARE survey is run. The underlying
assumption is that consumption and saving react to changes in income un-
certainty observed in the recent past, namely during the two years before
the interview. The combinations of year and wave used in this analysis are
described in Table 1. Descriptive statistics of the baseline sample are shown
in Table 2.
Measuring income risk. We use the EU-SILC dataset to construct two
indicators for, respectively, income and unemployment risk. The first one is
11
a measure of overall income uncertainty, and it captures the dispersion of
the unexplained component of income. We first estimate the deterministic
component of income as a function of gender, age, and education. We allow
the age profile of income to depend on gender and education, and we run sep-
arate regressions by country and wave.11 The dispersion of the unexplained
component of labor earnings is the standard deviation of the residuals from
such regressions by ‘type’ of individual. A ‘type’ is defined as a partition of
the sample including all respondents with the same age, gender and educa-
tional level, surveyed in the same county and wave. In the empirical analysis
(equation 12), we estimate the impact of a change in this measure on the
growth rate of parents’ consumption. Identification hinges on two main as-
sumptions. First, the relevant reference group to evaluate income risk is
denoted by gender, age, education level and country.12 Second, the change
in the dispersion of the unexplained income component (∆σot in equation
12) captures the revision in offspring’s income uncertainty. As pointed out
by Banks, Blundell, and Brugiavini (2001), to assess the precautionary mo-
tive for saving what matters is the conditional variance of the income shock,
namely the expected value of the variance of income innovation. We argue
that a change in the dispersion of the unexplained component of income is
a good proxy the update in the information set used to make predictions of
the variance of innovations. In other words, a change in the dispersion of
unexplained income component within the reference group, determines a re-
vision in expectated uncertainty on future income. This assumption hinges
on Meghir and Pistaferri (2004), who show a strong evidence of state de-
pendence in the conditional variance of income shocks.13 It follows that a
change in conditional variance of income innovation reflects into a revision
11More precisely, we regress individual income on a set of dummy variables for gender,
age brackets (five year dummies), educational level (below secondary, secondary, tertiary)
and the full set of interactions among them, to allow the age profile of income to depend
on gender and education. We run separate regressions by country and wave. We consider
separately the sub-sample of respondents aged 21-55 for offspring and 51-80 for parents.
12Which is the geographical size of the labor market considered by individuals to form
their expectations is not straightforward. We calculate the dispersion of income residual
at the national level because of several reasons. First of all, within country migration may
weaken the relevance of local labor market conditions, while language and institutional
factors make the country labor market the natural geographical unit. In addition, there are
data limitations. Information about the region of residence (NUTS regions) is not available
in EU-SILC data for all the years and country we consider. Moreover, the sample size of
cells delimited by gender, age, education and region is often too small to provide a reliable
measure for income dispersion.
13They estimate an ARCH process for the conditional variance of permanent and tran-
sitory shocks. The persistence parameter turns out to be up to 0.9 for the permanent
shock of high school graduates.
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in expectations of future income risk, which is our measure of interest.14
We calculate the indicator for uncertainty described above using two al-
ternative income variables. First, in line with Banks, Blundell, and Bru-
giavini (2001), we refer to a broad definition which includes all sources of
non-asset income – including benefit income. By considering dynamics of
income, rather than wages or earnings, we implicitly consider uncertainty in
the level of earnings as well as the unemployment risk. Therefore, we include
benefits to our income definition to account for the income attached to the
non participation state, whatever its source. The second measure of risk is
based on labor earnings only. This allows to examine the role of the welfare
state to explain cross-country heterogeneity in the response of parental choice
to offspring’s income risk.
The second indicator we use in the empirical analysis is designed to cap-
ture unemployment risk. It is the change in the observed share of unemployed
individuals by ‘type’. We expect consumption to be particularly sensitive
to this measure, because unemployment is associated with zero income and,
therefore, with a larger utility loss. Moreover, we expect the impact of unem-
ployment risk of children on parental consumption to be negatively correlated
with the availability of other forms of insurance, namely private savings and
unemployment benefits.
The average predicted income in our sample for the second generation
is about 29,000 euros, while the average indicator for income risk is about
19,000 euros (Table 3).15 Some examples of the estimated age profile of
income and income risk are plotted in Figure 1. Both expected income and
its uncertainty are higher for older, more educated and male respondents.
While this may seem counter-intuitive, Meghir and Pistaferri (2004, p.10)
state that ‘the higher returns emanating from increased education come at
the cost of higher income risk’. Figure 2 displays the trends of unemployment
for the same countries and years showing the opposite result: expectedly,
unemployment is higher for younger and less educated individuals, while
there is no significant difference between women and men.
14Unfortunately, the panel dimension of our data is too narrow to disentangle permanent
and transitory shocks, using the method developed by Meghir and Pistaferri (2004).
15We rely on cells with at least 50 observations, while we drop partitions with less than
50 individuals.
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5 Results
First-difference estimate baseline results are reported in Table 4.16 A key as-
pect of the present study is the measurement of risk. As described in section
4, the standard deviation of the residuals is a good proxy for uncertainty,
even more in a first difference setting, where we assess the effect of the vari-
ation of such standard deviation over the previous period. However, in order
to study the possible effect of a different income measure, we replicate the
analysis in the baseline model using three measures of risk: the standard
deviation of residuals of disposable income (panel a), the same measure com-
puted excluding transfers from the notion of income (panel b), and the risk of
unemployment (panel c). In all panels, the most parsimonious specification
(column 1) only includes as controls the logarithm of self-reported equiva-
lent income of parents, of predicted (from EU-SILC) income of the offspring
and the standard deviation of residuals of parental income. Parental con-
sumption turns out to respond significantly to a change in offspring’s income
risk, as predicted by the theoretical model, as well as to a change in the
income of both generation. One standard deviation increase in income risk
reflects into a contraction by about 1.2% in parental consumption,17 while
a one percentage point increase in unemployment risk lowers parental con-
sumption by about .285%. With respect to income, a one percent increase
in parental income increases consumption by about .02% and the same vari-
ation in offspring income fosters consumption by .05% to .096%, depending
on the model. These key findings support the implications of the theoretical
model illustrated in Section 2. First, we find evidence on altruism of par-
ents, who care about their offspring’s income. Moreover, inter-generational
precautionary savings turns out to be relevant in our sample: we find a sig-
nificant link between income risk of offspring and parents’ consumption and
saving choices.
Estimate results for the main coefficients of interests are robust to the
addition of controls. Columns (2) and (3) report estimate results when con-
trolling for additional child’s and parents’ covariates. As expected, parents’
consumption is increasing with their own family income, while it does not
react to increasing uncertainty. This is possibly due to respondents older
than 50 – who are close to their retirement or retired – facing modest uncer-
tainty, and by the negligible impact of labor income risk in late stage of the
life-cycle, when human capital represents a minor component of permanent
16Tables A.1, A.2 and A.3 in appendix report all the coefficients relative to the control
variables.
17More precisely, −.00064 ∗ 18.915 = −.0121 in the model with overall income and
−.00060 ∗ 19.482 = −.0117 when excluding transfers.
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income. In this line, estimated coefficients are almost identical when ex-
cluding parental income risk (column 4). Such specification also controls for
the potential collinearity between parents’ and children’s income risk: once
parental income risk is dropped, the coefficient for offspring risk is virtually
unchanged, confirming the absence of collinearity.
A possible threat to causal interpretation of our results is related to re-
verse causality: respondents who consume more could be more willing to
work more, this reflecting into a higher income. This reverse causality, along
with the presence of unobserved shocks which can affect both consumption
and labor supply, may determine endogeneity in equation (12). To address
this issue, we substitute self-reported income with predicted family income
from EU-SILC. Being determined only by age, gender and educational sta-
tus, such predicted income should be significantly less affected, if any, by the
reverse causality issue. Results are shown in column (5) and corroborate the
hypothesis of no reverse causality: the coefficient related to uncertainty of
offspring is almost unchanged, while the effect of parental income turns out
to be positive and significant.
6 Robustness checks
Omitted variables. One threat to causal interpretation of our results is
related to omitted variables, which could be correlated with consumption of
parents and some of the regressors, biasing our results. In this regard a pow-
erful advantage of the first difference regression is that it conditions out any
household unobserved heterogeneity. However, to address the issue, in the
baseline model we control for a set of time-varying covariates for both gen-
erations. To further mitigate this potential problem we extend the baseline
specification to include additional controls for parents and offspring, which
could determine a revision in parental consumption choices.
Tables 5 and 6 check the robustness of our findings to the inclusion of ad-
ditional controls for, respectively, parents and offspring.18 The rationale for
these tests is to rule out that the impact we estimate is weakened by spuri-
ous correlation of estimated income risk with omitted time-varying variables.
First, consumption choices could depend on job status not only of the house-
hold head, but also of the spouse. For this reason, in column (2) of Table 5,
we control for retirement and unemployment of the two spouses and results
are confirmed. Second, we add to the vector of regressors a self-reported
measure for poor health status, which is possibly associated with an increase
18Column (1) of both tables report the full set of regressors of the baseline model as in
column (3), panel a of Table 4.
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in out-of-pocket expenditure (column 3). We also include a variable for the
number of children and grandchildren, which could drive an increase in child-
care expenditure of children (column 4) and in turn a larger saving for the
grandparents. These two variables do not significantly affect consumption,
and their inclusion does not alter estimate of the main coefficient of interest.
Finally, children of wealthier households may choose riskier education and
job career because they can rely on parental resources to face income risk
or shocks. First difference estimation allows to tackle this issue inasmuch
as the position in the wealth distribution of parents is persistent over time.
However, we also test the robustness of our findings to the inclusion of net fi-
nancial assets among the controls (column 5). The coefficient is positive and
significant but leaves unchanged the effect of income uncertainty, suggesting
that its role does not depend on the parental net financial asset. Given the
drop in sample size, however, we choose not to include this control variable
in the baseline model.
Table 6 shows estimate results when extending the set of child variables.
We control for child’s marital status (column 2), since married children could
rely on more sources of income from partner and parents in law in case of a
negative shock; for cohabiting child (column 3), assuming that cohabitation
itself is a way to self-insure against income shocks; frequency of contacts with
parents (column 4), to control for time-varying relations between child and
parents; and disability (column 5), that may affect the reaction of parents
to possible income shocks of the child. None of these variables significantly
affects our findings. Finally, in column (6) we control for children other than
the first who are unemployed or disabled. Again, no effect is found.
Sample selection and placebo test Even if the first difference approach
allows to rule out any time-invariant personal and household characteristic
and the time fixed effects do the same for time trends common to all individ-
uals, one may suspect that the source of variability we identify is correlated
to some other feature that may affect parental consumption. In order to
verify that this is not the case, we can replicate the model by adding also
households without children (for which we set to 0 both income and risk of
children) and by randomizing child risk across households (both with chil-
dren only and in the enlarged sample). Table 7 shows that the inclusion of
about one sixth of the sample without children lowers the coefficient of child
risk and child income and makes them not statistically significant at usual
levels. The coefficients referred to parental income and characteristics are
virtually unaffected, while we drop child controls in order to pool households
with and without children in the same regression.
16
Household composition. In the baseline model we consider the effects of
income level, income uncertainty and personal characteristics of the oldest
child on parental consumption. However, in case of more than one child,
consumption decisions of parents might be driven by income risk of younger
children, or – more generally – may be driven by the riskiest child. In order
to control for this, we replicate the analysis in the baseline model by replac-
ing the standard deviation of residual income of the first child with that of
the riskiest child, of the less risky child, and an average of all children (up
to the fifth). In this model, we also drop single children characteristics and
we include (the log of) the average of all children incomes. Table 8 compares
the baseline results on the first child (column 1) with those on the less risky
child (column 2), the average risk of all children (column 3) and the riski-
est child (column 4) and results seem to corroborate our main hypotheses:
parental consumption is unaffected by the risk of the less risky child, while
it is negatively influenced by the pooled risk of all children and by the risk of
the riskiest child. Unsurprisingly, the coefficients of risk variables are slightly
lower than the baseline model, since the driving channel is moderated by the
presence of other children than may counteract it.
In addition, the effect of uncertainty on consumption may differ across
households type.19 A first dimension we can take into account is the num-
ber of children parents have, independently of their riskiness, and whether
the parent lives alone or with a partner. Table 9 shows that parents with
more than one child reacts significantly more than others to their first child
income shocks and that single parents are more willing to save in response
to an increase of child income uncertainty. A second, related aspect is the
geographical distance between parents and child. Even if we have controlled
for the frequency of contacts between parents and child in Table 6, we repli-
cate the baseline model for different samples according to the geographical
distance between the child and the parents. Not surprisingly, Table 10 shows
how the effect is decreasing with the distance.
Cross-country comparison. Cross-country differences in the strength of
the intergenerational precautionary motive for saving could be related to
different degrees of generosity in welfare systems, and by heterogeneity in
culture and family ties. We investigate the extent to which the average effect
is heterogeneous across European countries in Tables 11 and 12, in which
we exclude groups of countries from the general sample and we compare the
19Since these sample selections are not completely exogenous, we must be cautious when
interpreting the results.
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results to the baseline model.20 The coefficients for both the standard devia-
tion of residuals and the risk of unemployment are lower and less significant
when excluding Southern and Eastern countries, suggesting that the effect
of uncertainty is stronger in these clusters of countries, while the opposite is
true for Scandinavian countries and Central European countries, in the latter
group only for unemployment risk.
The reasons behind these findings might be either that in Scandinavian
countries and – to a lesser extent – in Central European countries income
and unemployment risks are not perceived as an important issue which it is
not worthy to save for, or that in those countries the welfare state is a good
substitute for the informal parental and family support. In principle, it is
also possible that non of these is true, but that parents just care less about
children income risk, that is, in terms of out theoretical model, the parameter
α could be lower in those regions.
Age comparison. The coefficient of prudence might change according to
the age of the second generation. Indeed, not only risk is different across age
groups, but also the possible reaction of parents to offspring risk may change.
Figures 3 and 4 show how the coefficients vary across first child age groups for
standard deviation of residual income and unemployment risk, respectively.
While the trend for the first risk measure is not very clear, apart from a
spike for children aged 31-35, unemployment risk seems to negatively affect
the consumption of all parents with offspring younger than 45.
Heterogeneity by income class. We have shown previously that results
are consistent after the inclusion of net financial asset. However, one may
wonder whether the effect of uncertainty on precautionary saving is constant
for every level of income, or it is stronger among the poorest (maybe because
they have a larger coefficient of prudence) or the richest (maybe because they
can afford to adjust consumption more than poor households close to sub-
sistence income). Table 13 reports the baseline specification for households
above and below the median21 and for two risk measures.
Food consumption as a lower bound. Even if the effects shown in
the baseline model are statistically significant, their magnitude seems to be
20Our choice is due to the relatively small sample size within groups of countries, that
does not allow to estimate reliable coefficients.
21Given the panel structure of the data, medians have been computed by country and
wave, that is we have splitted the sample for every country and every wave in the final
sample. Due to the relatively low sample size, we did not disaggregate at a lower level,
nor we split the sample in quartiles.
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small. However, as highlighted in section 4, it should be noticed that it is a
lower bound, since we analyze the effects on food consumption only. More in
detail, the elasticity of demand is increasing with the ‘durability’ of goods,
meaning that the more durable the good, the more elastic its demand. We
can safely assume that food consumption has a rigid demand, and therefore
should be less sensitive to income or risk shocks. Indeed, if we estimate our
baseline model using only food consumption at home (Table 14), the size of
both coefficients on income and risk drop by about 8% and 17% with respect
to the baseline model. Consistently, if we include as a dependent variable
only food consumed outside (Table 15) the coefficients rise dramatically (by
5% and 100%)), confirming that our results can indeed be considered as a
lower bound.
7 Conclusion
Several motives for saving have been extensively analyzed by the economic lit-
erature. This paper contributes to the literature on consumption and saving
by examining the interaction between altruistic reasons and the precaution-
ary motive. A simple theoretical model predicts that current consumption of
parents depends not only on their own and their offspring life cycle income,
positively, but also on the perceived dispersion of future incomes, negatively.
We test these implications using an individual panel data with exogenous
measures of income risk, and we find a significant negative effect of income
uncertainty in the offspring’s generation on parents’ consumption choices,
which are consistent with inter-generational precautionary savings.
This channel is expected to be particularly relevant in the last decade,
when the financial crisis worsened labor market conditions and increased in-
come uncertainty, especially among the young. In the period 2006-2015 total
unemployment in the Euro area, reported by Eurostat, increased from 8.4%
to 10.9%. Youth unemployment rose in the same period from 17.2% to 22.4%,
with dramatic figures for Greece (from 25.0% to 49.8%), Spain (from 17.9%
to 48.3%), Italy (from 21.8% to 40.3%). The paper conveys two main mes-
sages from a policy perspective. On the one side, future income uncertainty
lowers consumption not only of those individuals affected by it, but also of
their parents, or other people supporting their income. On the other side,
public welfare policies (as unemployment benefits and income support) may
substitute family ties and informal networks, generating a positive spill-over
beyond the target of the policies.
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Figures and Tables
Figure 1: Estimate of predicted income and standard deviation of residuals:
selected years and countries
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Figure 2: Estimate of unemployment rates: selected years and countries
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Figure 3: Baseline specification across age – Standard deviation of residuals
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Figure 4: Baseline specification across age – Unemployment risk
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Table 1: Distribution of SHARE and EU-
SILC observations across countries and
over time.
Year
Country 2004 2007 2011 2013 2015
AT Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
BE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
CH . Yes Yes Yes Yes
CZ . Yes Yes Yes Yes
DE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
DK Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
EE . . Yes Yes Yes
ES . Yes Yes Yes Yes
FR Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
IT . Yes Yes Yes Yes
LU . . . Yes Yes
NL Yes Yes Yes Yes .
PL . Yes Yes . .
SE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
SI . . Yes Yes Yes
Each country-year includes 42 cells, defined by
7 age classes, 3 education classes and 2 genders.
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Table 2: Summary statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev.
Food cons., equiv. (in log) 43193 8.125 .477
Child sd. dev. residual income 43193 18.915 14
Child income (predicted, 000) 43193 27.995 17.572
Child sd. dev. residual income, net of transfers 43193 19.482 14.066
Child income (predicted, 000), net of transfers 43193 26.805 17.322
HH st. dev. residual income 43193 16.59 22.433
HH equiv. income (000) 43193 23 106.63
HH equiv. income (predicted, 000) 43193 23.72 17.525
HH head in a couple 43193 .692 .462
HH head retired 43193 .607 .488
HH head unemployed 43193 .023 .149
Child in full-time work 43193 .763 .425
Child in part-time work 43193 .088 .283
Child unemployed 43193 .05 .217
Child unempl. risk (SILC) 43193 .071 .066
Child married 42386 .598 .49
Child cohabiting with parents 37957 .083 .275
Child living within 1 km 37957 .231 .422
Many contacts (at least once a week) 38723 .804 .397
Child disable 43193 .015 .123
At least one child unemployed 43193 .1 .3
At least one child disable 43193 .03 .172
HH head in poor health conditions 43193 .343 .475
HH head children 43193 2.331 1.094
HH head grand-children 43193 2.813 2.677
Net financial assets (in log) 38429 9.039 3.808
Table 3: Summary statistics: off-
spring’s imputed income and income
risk.
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
Predicted income 22757.535 16648.28
St. dev. residuals 16164.387 14224.797
Monetary values are expressed in PPP real
values (thousand euros, Germany 2005). Ob-
servations are the 2.666 country-year cells.
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Table 4: First-differences regressions; dependent variable: logarithm of household equivalent food consumption.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
Child sd. dev. residual income -0.00064** -0.00064** -0.00064** -0.00064** -0.00060**
(0.00027) (0.00027) (0.00027) (0.00027) (0.00027)
Child income (predicted, in log) 0.09563*** 0.09621*** 0.09596*** 0.09604*** 0.08466***
(0.01423) (0.01422) (0.01428) (0.01428) (0.01433)
HH st. dev. residual income 0.00003 0.00003 0.00003 . -0.00005
(0.00010) (0.00010) (0.00010) . (0.00010)
HH equiv. income (in log) 0.02229*** 0.02252*** 0.02251*** 0.02251*** .
(0.00235) (0.00236) (0.00236) (0.00236) .
HH equiv. income (predicted, in log) . . . . 0.08127***
. . . . (0.00840)
Obs. 43193 43193 43193 43193 43193
Child sd. dev. residual income, net of transfers -0.00060** -0.00060** -0.00060** -0.00060** -0.00057**
(0.00028) (0.00028) (0.00028) (0.00028) (0.00028)
Child income (predicted, in log), net of transfers 0.07991*** 0.08038*** 0.08014*** 0.08021*** 0.07136***
(0.01263) (0.01263) (0.01268) (0.01268) (0.01269)
HH st. dev. residual income 0.00003 0.00003 0.00003 . -0.00006
(0.00010) (0.00010) (0.00010) . (0.00010)
HH equiv. income (in log) 0.02230*** 0.02254*** 0.02253*** 0.02253*** .
(0.00235) (0.00236) (0.00236) (0.00236) .
HH equiv. income (predicted, in log) . . . . 0.08199***
. . . . (0.00839)
Obs. 43193 43193 43193 43193 43193
Child unempl. risk (SILC) -0.28500*** -0.28332*** -0.28444*** -0.28456*** -0.30102***
(0.06908) (0.06907) (0.06914) (0.06913) (0.06904)
Child income (predicted, in log) 0.05338*** 0.05421*** 0.05387*** 0.05392*** 0.04108***
(0.01572) (0.01571) (0.01575) (0.01575) (0.01577)
HH st. dev. residual income 0.00003 0.00002 0.00002 . -0.00006
(0.00010) (0.00010) (0.00010) . (0.00010)
HH equiv. income (in log) 0.02223*** 0.02246*** 0.02246*** 0.02246*** .
(0.00235) (0.00236) (0.00236) (0.00236) .
HH equiv. income (predicted, in log) . . . . 0.08203***
. . . . (0.00839)
Obs. 43193 43193 43193 43193 43193
Control variables (in all panels above)
Household heada No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Childb No No Yes Yes Yes
Time dummiesc Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Monetary values are expressed in PPP real values (thousand euros, Germany 2005).
Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
a Household head in a copule, household head retired, household head unemployed.
b Child in full-time work, child in part-time work, child unemployed.
c Year dummies (2007, 2011, 2013, 2015).
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Table 5: Robustness. First-differences regressions; dependent variable: logarithm of household equivalent
food consumption. Additional parental controls.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
Child sd. dev. residual income -0.00064** -0.00064** -0.00064** -0.00064** -0.00067**
(0.00027) (0.00027) (0.00027) (0.00027) (0.00030)
Child income (predicted, in log) 0.09596*** 0.09560*** 0.09602*** 0.09581*** 0.09311***
(0.01428) (0.01429) (0.01428) (0.01428) (0.01616)
HH st. dev. residual income 0.00003 0.00003 0.00003 0.00003 0.00007
(0.00010) (0.00010) (0.00010) (0.00010) (0.00011)
HH equiv. income (in log) 0.02251*** 0.02253*** 0.02251*** 0.02250*** 0.02321***
(0.00236) (0.00236) (0.00236) (0.00236) (0.00265)
HH head in a couple -0.02595* -0.02358 -0.02597* -0.02653* -0.03018*
(0.01480) (0.01481) (0.01479) (0.01481) (0.01654)
HH head retired -0.01948*** . -0.01943*** -0.01961*** -0.02344***
(0.00694) . (0.00694) (0.00695) (0.00774)
HH head unemployed -0.06187*** . -0.06195*** -0.06185*** -0.06759***
(0.01423) . (0.01423) (0.01423) (0.01634)
Child in full-time work 0.00211 0.00216 0.00213 0.00235 0.00560
(0.00794) (0.00794) (0.00794) (0.00794) (0.00892)
Child in part-time work 0.01229 0.01241 0.01230 0.01243 0.01328
(0.00982) (0.00981) (0.00982) (0.00982) (0.01089)
Child unemployed 0.00682 0.00715 0.00682 0.00691 0.01403
(0.01089) (0.01089) (0.01089) (0.01089) (0.01253)
HH head or partner retired . -0.01903*** . . .
. (0.00642) . . .
HH head or partner unemployed . -0.05250*** . . .
. (0.01155) . . .
HH head in poor health conditions . . 0.00203 . .
. . (0.00537) . .
HH head children . . . 0.00414 .
. . . (0.00596) .
HH head grand-children . . . 0.00223 .
. . . (0.00245) .
Net financial assets (in log) . . . . 0.00352***
. . . . (0.00069)
Constant -0.04658*** -0.04583*** -0.04675*** -0.04723*** -0.04385***
(0.00834) (0.00835) (0.00835) (0.00837) (0.00947)
Wave FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 43193 43193 43193 43193 34514
∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Monetary values are expressed in PPP real values (thousand euros,
Germany 2005). Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
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Table 6: Robustness. First-differences regressions; dependent variable: logarithm of household equivalent food consumption.
Additional child’s controls.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
Child sd. dev. residual income -0.00064** -0.00063** -0.00061** -0.00069** -0.00064** -0.00064**
(0.00027) (0.00028) (0.00029) (0.00030) (0.00027) (0.00027)
Child income (predicted, in log) 0.09596*** 0.09902*** 0.11342*** 0.12365*** 0.09611*** 0.09647***
(0.01428) (0.01449) (0.01601) (0.01662) (0.01429) (0.01428)
HH st. dev. residual income 0.00003 -0.00000 0.00012 0.00015 0.00003 0.00003
(0.00010) (0.00010) (0.00011) (0.00011) (0.00010) (0.00010)
HH equiv. income (in log) 0.02251*** 0.02197*** 0.02173*** 0.02254*** 0.02250*** 0.02248***
(0.00236) (0.00239) (0.00251) (0.00256) (0.00236) (0.00236)
HH head in a couple -0.02595* -0.02824* -0.02011 -0.02649 -0.02595* -0.02581*
(0.01480) (0.01497) (0.01609) (0.01631) (0.01480) (0.01480)
HH head retired -0.01948*** -0.02012*** -0.01710** -0.01923*** -0.01947*** -0.01945***
(0.00694) (0.00702) (0.00740) (0.00744) (0.00694) (0.00694)
HH head unemployed -0.06187*** -0.06387*** -0.06349*** -0.07166*** -0.06185*** -0.06172***
(0.01423) (0.01446) (0.01540) (0.01555) (0.01423) (0.01422)
Child in full-time work 0.00211 0.00352 0.00093 0.00117 0.00026 -0.00447
(0.00794) (0.00810) (0.00869) (0.00885) (0.00805) (0.00714)
Child in part-time work 0.01229 0.01314 0.01140 0.01026 0.01043 0.00614
(0.00982) (0.00996) (0.01063) (0.01088) (0.00990) (0.00929)
Child unemployed 0.00682 0.00823 0.00964 0.01297 0.00452 .
(0.01089) (0.01106) (0.01183) (0.01210) (0.01105) .
At least one child unemployed . . . . . -0.01205
. . . . . (0.00736)
Child married . -0.00490 . . . .
. (0.00805) . . . .
Child cohabiting with parents . . -0.03146** . . .
. . (0.01412) . . .
Many contacts (at least once a week) . . . 0.00260 . .
. . . (0.00680) . .
Child disable . . . . -0.02331 .
. . . . (0.02433) .
At least one child disable . . . . . -0.00196
. . . . . (0.01685)
Constant -0.04658*** -0.04743*** -0.04927*** -0.04140*** -0.04653*** -0.04666***
(0.00834) (0.00837) (0.00840) (0.00879) (0.00834) (0.00834)
Wave FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 43193 42202 37814 36865 43193 43193
∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Monetary values are expressed in PPP real values (thousand euros, Germany 2005). Robust
standard errors in parenthesis.
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Table 7: Robustness. First-differences regressions; dependent variable: logarithm of household
equivalent food consumption. Random child risk.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
b/se b/se b/se b/se
Baseline No children Baseline No children
Child sd. dev. residual income -0.00064** -0.00014 . .
(0.00027) (0.00026) . .
Child sd. dev. residual income (random) . . 0.00004 -0.00001
. . (0.00012) (0.00011)
Child income (predicted, in log) 0.09621*** 0.00191 0.08669*** 0.00159
(0.01422) (0.00193) (0.01355) (0.00183)
HH st. dev. residual income 0.00003 0.00007 0.00003 0.00007
(0.00010) (0.00009) (0.00010) (0.00009)
HH equiv. income (in log) 0.02252*** 0.01971*** 0.02256*** 0.01972***
(0.00236) (0.00217) (0.00236) (0.00217)
HH head in a couple -0.02595* -0.02449* -0.02601* -0.02445*
(0.01479) (0.01369) (0.01479) (0.01369)
HH head retired -0.01943*** -0.01363** -0.01947*** -0.01364**
(0.00694) (0.00648) (0.00694) (0.00648)
HH head unemployed -0.06189*** -0.06025*** -0.06194*** -0.06026***
(0.01422) (0.01315) (0.01422) (0.01315)
Constant -0.04655*** -0.03625*** -0.04695*** -0.03649***
(0.00834) (0.00763) (0.00833) (0.00761)
Wave FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 43193 50083 43193 50083
∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Monetary values are expressed in PPP real values (thousand
euros, Germany 2005). Robust standard errors in parenthesis. The sample in columns (2) and (4)
is increased by 6889 households with no children.
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Table 8: Robustness. First-differences regressions; dependent variable: logarithm of household equiva-
lent food consumption. Pooled children risk.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
b/se b/se b/se b/se
Child sd. dev. residual income -0.00064** . . .
(0.00027) . . .
Min of children sd. dev. residual income . 0.00057 . .
. (0.00045) . .
Mean of children sd. dev. residual income . . -0.00059 .
. . (0.00037) .
Max of children sd. dev. residual income . . . -0.00054**
. . . (0.00022)
Child income (predicted, in log) 0.09621*** . . .
(0.01422) . . .
Mean of children income (predicted, in log) . 0.09107*** 0.10396*** 0.10505***
. (0.01595) (0.01609) (0.01574)
HH st. dev. residual income 0.00003 0.00003 0.00002 0.00003
(0.00010) (0.00010) (0.00010) (0.00010)
HH equiv. income (in log) 0.02252*** 0.02249*** 0.02243*** 0.02242***
(0.00236) (0.00236) (0.00236) (0.00236)
HH head in a couple -0.02595* -0.02576* -0.02582* -0.02568*
(0.01479) (0.01480) (0.01480) (0.01480)
HH head retired -0.01943*** -0.01987*** -0.01981*** -0.01981***
(0.00694) (0.00694) (0.00694) (0.00694)
HH head unemployed -0.06189*** -0.06167*** -0.06148*** -0.06140***
(0.01422) (0.01422) (0.01423) (0.01423)
Constant -0.04655*** -0.04802*** -0.04719*** -0.04701***
(0.00834) (0.00839) (0.00840) (0.00839)
Wave FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 43193 43193 43193 43193
∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Monetary values are expressed in PPP real values (thousand euros,
Germany 2005). Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
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Table 9: Robustness. First-differences regressions; dependent variable: logarithm of household equivalent food
consumption. Household composition.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
One child Two children More than two Single Couple
Child sd. dev. residual income 0.00050 -0.00088** -0.00078* -0.00110** -0.00038
(0.00063) (0.00040) (0.00045) (0.00045) (0.00035)
Child income (predicted, in log) 0.10600*** 0.10107*** 0.07997*** 0.22219*** 0.05123***
(0.03004) (0.02030) (0.02677) (0.03191) (0.01578)
HH st. dev. residual income 0.00018 0.00011 -0.00009 0.00025 -0.00000
(0.00024) (0.00015) (0.00016) (0.00029) (0.00010)
HH equiv. income (in log) 0.01401*** 0.02617*** 0.02238*** 0.02306*** 0.02225***
(0.00537) (0.00336) (0.00419) (0.00455) (0.00266)
HH equiv. income (predicted, in log) . . . . .
. . . . .
HH head in a couple -0.00285 -0.03315 -0.03111 0.00512 -0.09279***
(0.03079) (0.02148) (0.02715) (0.01787) (0.02916)
HH head retired -0.02335 -0.00013 -0.04304*** -0.03323** -0.01273
(0.01662) (0.01003) (0.01182) (0.01360) (0.00794)
HH head unemployed -0.04654 -0.05863*** -0.07605*** -0.10732*** -0.03981**
(0.03264) (0.02082) (0.02414) (0.02917) (0.01594)
Child in full-time work 0.02660 -0.01307 0.00721 -0.00497 0.00558
(0.01718) (0.01170) (0.01387) (0.01677) (0.00873)
Child in part-time work 0.06432*** -0.02316 0.02907* 0.00433 0.01623
(0.02176) (0.01437) (0.01706) (0.02032) (0.01098)
Child unemployed 0.04164* -0.00999 0.00730 -0.00532 0.01313
(0.02365) (0.01591) (0.01926) (0.02150) (0.01240)
Constant -0.05295*** -0.03360*** -0.05864*** -0.07313*** -0.03420***
(0.01910) (0.01204) (0.01438) (0.01681) (0.00945)
Wave FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 8205 20419 14566 13302 29891
∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Monetary values are expressed in PPP real values (thousand euros, Germany
2005). Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
34
Table 10: Robustness. First-differences regressions; dependent variable: logarithm of household equivalent
food consumption. Distance from the child.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
Cohabiting Non-cohabiting < 25 km >= 25 km All
Child sd. dev. residual income -0.00177§ -0.00061** -0.00062§ -0.00058 -0.00065**
(0.00109) (0.00031) (0.00041) (0.00048) (0.00030)
Child income (predicted, in log) 0.12877*** 0.11925*** 0.12490*** 0.10745*** 0.11715***
(0.03963) (0.01775) (0.02381) (0.02676) (0.01618)
HH st. dev. residual income -0.00005 0.00011 0.00009 0.00011 0.00010
(0.00050) (0.00011) (0.00018) (0.00014) (0.00011)
HH equiv. income (in log) 0.02131*** 0.02174*** 0.02033*** 0.02393*** 0.02183***
(0.00700) (0.00275) (0.00339) (0.00473) (0.00256)
HH head in a couple 0.07024 -0.03181* -0.01783 -0.05347** -0.02372
(0.05782) (0.01720) (0.02213) (0.02728) (0.01650)
HH head retired -0.03603 -0.01846** -0.01857* -0.01824§ -0.01949***
(0.03063) (0.00774) (0.01007) (0.01209) (0.00751)
HH head unemployed -0.00377 -0.07253*** -0.09423*** -0.04257* -0.06363***
(0.04376) (0.01673) (0.02217) (0.02540) (0.01563)
Child in full-time work -0.03938§ 0.00823 0.01145 0.00404 0.00159
(0.02659) (0.00934) (0.01307) (0.01334) (0.00879)
Child in part-time work 0.00180 0.01421 0.01239 0.01804 0.01059
(0.03189) (0.01139) (0.01520) (0.01745) (0.01075)
Child unemployed -0.01806 0.01481 0.01607 0.01457 0.00924
(0.03027) (0.01310) (0.01760) (0.01966) (0.01199)
Constant -0.12011*** -0.04636*** -0.04927*** -0.04168*** -0.04932***
(0.03940) (0.00875) (0.01134) (0.01376) (0.00852)
Wave FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 3139 33376 19690 13686 36515
§p < 0.15,∗ p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Monetary values are expressed in PPP real values (thousand
euros, Germany 2005). Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
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Table 11: Heterogeneity by country group. First-differences regressions; dependent variable: logarithm of
household equivalent food consumption.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
Baseline South Scandinavian Center East
Child sd. dev. residual income -0.00064** -0.00051 -0.00074** -0.00067* -0.00052*
(0.00027) (0.00031) (0.00034) (0.00035) (0.00028)
Child income (predicted, in log) 0.09596*** 0.09650*** 0.10755*** 0.12637*** 0.04235**
(0.01428) (0.01554) (0.01564) (0.01773) (0.01746)
HH st. dev. residual income 0.00003 0.00003 0.00020 0.00004 -0.00002
(0.00010) (0.00010) (0.00024) (0.00011) (0.00010)
HH equiv. income (in log) 0.02251*** 0.02281*** 0.02231*** 0.02559*** 0.01920***
(0.00236) (0.00282) (0.00250) (0.00303) (0.00262)
HH head in a couple -0.02595* -0.02247 -0.02429 -0.01375 -0.04096**
(0.01480) (0.01620) (0.01662) (0.01898) (0.01669)
HH head retired -0.01948*** -0.02013*** -0.01967** -0.02786*** -0.01265
(0.00694) (0.00762) (0.00776) (0.00922) (0.00771)
HH head unemployed -0.06187*** -0.07367*** -0.06929*** -0.05675*** -0.04384***
(0.01423) (0.01586) (0.01590) (0.01793) (0.01611)
Child in full-time work 0.00211 0.00145 0.00395 0.00186 0.00192
(0.00794) (0.00876) (0.00916) (0.01011) (0.00873)
Child in part-time work 0.01229 0.00652 0.01821 0.01009 0.01367
(0.00982) (0.01068) (0.01108) (0.01399) (0.01049)
Child unemployed 0.00682 0.00256 0.00821 0.00560 0.01289
(0.01089) (0.01292) (0.01215) (0.01305) (0.01230)
Constant -0.04658*** -0.03625*** -0.06861*** -0.03524*** -0.04287***
(0.00834) (0.00843) (0.01071) (0.01234) (0.00841)
Wave FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 43193 34510 36504 26369 32196
∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Monetary values are expressed in PPP real values (thousand euros,
Germany 2005). Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Southern countries: France, Greece, Italy, Spain;
Scandinavian countries: Denmark and Sweden; Central European countries: Austria, Belgium, Germany,
Luxembourg, Netherlands and Switzerland; Eastern countries: Czech Republic, Estonia, Poland and Slove-
nia.
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Table 12: Heterogeneity by country group. First-differences regressions; dependent variable: logarithm of
household equivalent food consumption.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
Baseline South Scandinavian Center East
Child unempl. risk (SILC) -0.28444*** -0.15874** -0.38552*** -0.37404*** -0.11777
(0.06914) (0.07850) (0.08017) (0.08145) (0.08029)
Child income (predicted, in log) 0.05387*** 0.07211*** 0.05449*** 0.06493*** 0.02000
(0.01575) (0.01717) (0.01732) (0.02082) (0.01812)
HH st. dev. residual income 0.00002 0.00002 0.00021 0.00004 -0.00002
(0.00010) (0.00010) (0.00024) (0.00010) (0.00010)
HH equiv. income (in log) 0.02246*** 0.02278*** 0.02219*** 0.02534*** 0.01928***
(0.00236) (0.00282) (0.00249) (0.00303) (0.00262)
HH head in a couple -0.02553* -0.02223 -0.02359 -0.01303 -0.04092**
(0.01480) (0.01620) (0.01661) (0.01900) (0.01669)
HH head retired -0.01972*** -0.02020*** -0.02005*** -0.02790*** -0.01286*
(0.00694) (0.00762) (0.00776) (0.00921) (0.00772)
HH head unemployed -0.06166*** -0.07365*** -0.06896*** -0.05631*** -0.04377***
(0.01422) (0.01585) (0.01589) (0.01792) (0.01610)
Child in full-time work 0.00223 0.00159 0.00421 0.00195 0.00216
(0.00794) (0.00876) (0.00916) (0.01012) (0.00873)
Child in part-time work 0.01237 0.00664 0.01856* 0.00986 0.01384
(0.00982) (0.01068) (0.01109) (0.01400) (0.01049)
Child unemployed 0.00814 0.00293 0.01026 0.00754 0.01366
(0.01089) (0.01292) (0.01215) (0.01304) (0.01230)
Constant -0.04926*** -0.03829*** -0.07146*** -0.03809*** -0.04400***
(0.00837) (0.00848) (0.01073) (0.01236) (0.00847)
Wave FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 43193 34510 36504 26369 32196
∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Monetary values are expressed in PPP real values (thousand euros,
Germany 2005). Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Southern countries: France, Greece, Italy, Spain;
Scandinavian countries: Denmark and Sweden; Central European countries: Austria, Belgium, Germany,
Luxembourg, Netherlands and Switzerland; Eastern countries: Czech Republic, Estonia, Poland and Slove-
nia.
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Table 13: First-differences regressions; dependent variable: logarithm of household equiv-
alent food consumption. Sample split according to the median of household income by
country and wave.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
b/se b/se b/se b/se
Lower half Upper half Lower half Upper half
Child sd. dev. residual income -0.00081** -0.00040 . .
(0.00037) (0.00042) . .
Child unempl. risk (SILC) . . -0.19085* -0.37264***
. . (0.10307) (0.09271)
Child income (predicted, in log) 0.09677*** 0.09219*** 0.06198*** 0.04390**
(0.02165) (0.01906) (0.02374) (0.02100)
HH st. dev. residual income 0.00008 0.00002 0.00008 0.00001
(0.00024) (0.00011) (0.00024) (0.00011)
HH equiv. income (in log) 0.01864*** 0.02492*** 0.01861*** 0.02474***
(0.00315) (0.00385) (0.00314) (0.00384)
HH head in a couple -0.02510 -0.02892 -0.02511 -0.02838
(0.01980) (0.02228) (0.01983) (0.02224)
HH head retired -0.02912*** -0.01118 -0.02929*** -0.01147
(0.01020) (0.00946) (0.01020) (0.00946)
HH head unemployed -0.07021*** -0.05245** -0.07004*** -0.05248**
(0.01882) (0.02167) (0.01881) (0.02164)
Child in full-time work 0.00648 -0.00220 0.00678 -0.00240
(0.01251) (0.01013) (0.01251) (0.01014)
Child in part-time work 0.01052 0.01446 0.01069 0.01421
(0.01472) (0.01315) (0.01472) (0.01317)
Child unemployed 0.00969 0.00446 0.01087 0.00547
(0.01538) (0.01566) (0.01538) (0.01564)
Constant -0.06472*** -0.03191*** -0.06678*** -0.03498***
(0.01215) (0.01151) (0.01220) (0.01154)
Wave FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 21045 22148 21045 22148
∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Monetary values are expressed in PPP real values
(thousand euros, Germany 2005). Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
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Table 14: First-differences regressions; dependent variable: logarithm of household equivalent food consump-
tion at home.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
Child sd. dev. residual income -0.00050* -0.00050* -0.00050* -0.00050* -0.00046*
(0.00027) (0.00027) (0.00027) (0.00027) (0.00027)
Child income (predicted, in log) 0.08805*** 0.08841*** 0.08839*** 0.08835*** 0.07693***
(0.01406) (0.01405) (0.01411) (0.01411) (0.01415)
HH st. dev. residual income -0.00001 -0.00001 -0.00001 . -0.00010
(0.00011) (0.00011) (0.00011) . (0.00011)
HH equiv. income (in log) 0.02078*** 0.02051*** 0.02052*** 0.02051*** .
(0.00234) (0.00235) (0.00235) (0.00235) .
HH equiv. income (predicted, in log) . . . . 0.08200***
. . . . (0.00833)
HH head in a couple . 0.01138 0.01142 0.01142 0.00762
. (0.01478) (0.01478) (0.01478) (0.01480)
HH head retired . -0.01029 -0.01033 -0.01032 -0.00791
. (0.00691) (0.00691) (0.00691) (0.00690)
HH head unemployed . -0.04122*** -0.04130*** -0.04130*** -0.04402***
. (0.01340) (0.01341) (0.01341) (0.01340)
Child in full-time work . . 0.00101 0.00100 0.00150
. . (0.00785) (0.00785) (0.00784)
Child in part-time work . . 0.00500 0.00500 0.00594
. . (0.00976) (0.00976) (0.00976)
Child unemployed . . 0.00782 0.00783 0.00800
. . (0.01075) (0.01075) (0.01074)
Constant -0.04564*** -0.04521*** -0.04521*** -0.04521*** -0.05092***
(0.00850) (0.00852) (0.00852) (0.00852) (0.00840)
Wave FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 43193 43193 43193 43193 43193
∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Monetary values are expressed in PPP real values (thousand euros, Germany
2005). Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
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Table 15: First-differences regressions; dependent variable: logarithm of household equivalent food consump-
tion out of home.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
Child sd. dev. residual income -0.00122* -0.00121* -0.00118* -0.00118* -0.00115
(0.00070) (0.00070) (0.00070) (0.00070) (0.00070)
Child income (predicted, in log) 0.09575** 0.10000** 0.09507** 0.09572** 0.08408**
(0.03995) (0.03987) (0.04010) (0.04011) (0.04024)
HH st. dev. residual income 0.00030 0.00028 0.00027 . 0.00020
(0.00022) (0.00023) (0.00023) . (0.00023)
HH equiv. income (in log) 0.01095* 0.01348** 0.01344** 0.01346** .
(0.00626) (0.00628) (0.00629) (0.00629) .
HH equiv. income (predicted, in log) . . . . 0.08147***
. . . . (0.02388)
HH head in a couple . -0.18558*** -0.18549*** -0.18568*** -0.18741***
. (0.04317) (0.04316) (0.04316) (0.04293)
HH head retired . -0.07922*** -0.07934*** -0.07963*** -0.07697***
. (0.02091) (0.02092) (0.02091) (0.02092)
HH head unemployed . -0.12044*** -0.12014*** -0.12005*** -0.12090***
. (0.04591) (0.04595) (0.04595) (0.04592)
Child in full-time work . . 0.02204 0.02217 0.02185
. . (0.02199) (0.02199) (0.02199)
Child in part-time work . . 0.04811* 0.04829* 0.04821*
. . (0.02703) (0.02702) (0.02702)
Child unemployed . . 0.02246 0.02235 0.02291
. . (0.03602) (0.03603) (0.03599)
Constant -0.02161 -0.01822 -0.01862 -0.01870 -0.02272
(0.02022) (0.02027) (0.02027) (0.02027) (0.02003)
Wave FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 21771 21771 21771 21771 21771
∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Monetary values are expressed in PPP real values (thousand euros,
Germany 2005). Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
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A Additional Tables
Table A.1: First-differences regressions; dependent variable: logarithm of household equivalent food consump-
tion.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
Child sd. dev. residual income -0.00064** -0.00064** -0.00064** -0.00064** -0.00060**
(0.00027) (0.00027) (0.00027) (0.00027) (0.00027)
Child income (predicted, in log) 0.09563*** 0.09621*** 0.09596*** 0.09604*** 0.08466***
(0.01423) (0.01422) (0.01428) (0.01428) (0.01433)
HH st. dev. residual income 0.00003 0.00003 0.00003 . -0.00005
(0.00010) (0.00010) (0.00010) . (0.00010)
HH equiv. income (in log) 0.02229*** 0.02252*** 0.02251*** 0.02251*** .
(0.00235) (0.00236) (0.00236) (0.00236) .
HH equiv. income (predicted, in log) . . . . 0.08127***
. . . . (0.00840)
HH head in a couple . -0.02595* -0.02595* -0.02595* -0.02865*
. (0.01479) (0.01480) (0.01479) (0.01482)
HH head retired . -0.01943*** -0.01948*** -0.01950*** -0.01697**
. (0.00694) (0.00694) (0.00694) (0.00694)
HH head unemployed . -0.06189*** -0.06187*** -0.06187*** -0.06487***
. (0.01422) (0.01423) (0.01423) (0.01422)
Child in full-time work . . 0.00211 0.00211 0.00266
. . (0.00794) (0.00794) (0.00792)
Child in part-time work . . 0.01229 0.01230 0.01329
. . (0.00982) (0.00982) (0.00982)
Child unemployed . . 0.00682 0.00681 0.00696
. . (0.01089) (0.01089) (0.01088)
Constant -0.04699*** -0.04655*** -0.04658*** -0.04660*** -0.05305***
(0.00831) (0.00834) (0.00834) (0.00834) (0.00822)
Wave FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 43193 43193 43193 43193 43193
∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Monetary values are expressed in PPP real values (thousand euros, Germany
2005). Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
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Table A.2: First-differences regressions; dependent variable: logarithm of household equivalent food consumption. Trans-
fers not included in measure for offspring’s income.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
Child sd. dev. residual income, net of transfers -0.00060** -0.00060** -0.00060** -0.00060** -0.00057**
(0.00028) (0.00028) (0.00028) (0.00028) (0.00028)
Child income (predicted, in log), net of transfers 0.07991*** 0.08038*** 0.08014*** 0.08021*** 0.07136***
(0.01263) (0.01263) (0.01268) (0.01268) (0.01269)
HH st. dev. residual income 0.00003 0.00003 0.00003 . -0.00006
(0.00010) (0.00010) (0.00010) . (0.00010)
HH equiv. income (in log) 0.02230*** 0.02254*** 0.02253*** 0.02253*** .
(0.00235) (0.00236) (0.00236) (0.00236) .
HH equiv. income (predicted, in log) . . . . 0.08199***
. . . . (0.00839)
HH head in a couple . -0.02599* -0.02599* -0.02600* -0.02880*
. (0.01480) (0.01480) (0.01480) (0.01482)
HH head retired . -0.01943*** -0.01947*** -0.01949*** -0.01696**
. (0.00694) (0.00695) (0.00694) (0.00694)
HH head unemployed . -0.06176*** -0.06173*** -0.06173*** -0.06475***
. (0.01422) (0.01423) (0.01423) (0.01422)
Child in full-time work . . 0.00241 0.00241 0.00289
. . (0.00794) (0.00794) (0.00792)
Child in part-time work . . 0.01251 0.01251 0.01346
. . (0.00982) (0.00982) (0.00982)
Child unemployed . . 0.00709 0.00708 0.00718
. . (0.01089) (0.01089) (0.01088)
Constant -0.04595*** -0.04550*** -0.04554*** -0.04556*** -0.05219***
(0.00831) (0.00833) (0.00833) (0.00833) (0.00822)
Wave FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 43193 43193 43193 43193 43193
∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Monetary values are expressed in PPP real values (thousand euros, Germany 2005).
Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
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Table A.3: First-differences regressions; dependent variable: logarithm of household equivalent food consump-
tion. Share of unemployed individuals.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
Child unempl. risk (SILC) -0.28500*** -0.28332*** -0.28444*** -0.28456*** -0.30102***
(0.06908) (0.06907) (0.06914) (0.06913) (0.06904)
Child income (predicted, in log) 0.05338*** 0.05421*** 0.05387*** 0.05392*** 0.04108***
(0.01572) (0.01571) (0.01575) (0.01575) (0.01577)
HH st. dev. residual income 0.00003 0.00002 0.00002 . -0.00006
(0.00010) (0.00010) (0.00010) . (0.00010)
HH equiv. income (in log) 0.02223*** 0.02246*** 0.02246*** 0.02246*** .
(0.00235) (0.00236) (0.00236) (0.00236) .
HH equiv. income (predicted, in log) . . . . 0.08203***
. . . . (0.00839)
HH head in a couple . -0.02555* -0.02553* -0.02553* -0.02836*
. (0.01480) (0.01480) (0.01480) (0.01482)
HH head retired . -0.01967*** -0.01972*** -0.01974*** -0.01721**
. (0.00694) (0.00694) (0.00694) (0.00694)
HH head unemployed . -0.06167*** -0.06166*** -0.06167*** -0.06464***
. (0.01421) (0.01422) (0.01422) (0.01421)
Child in full-time work . . 0.00223 0.00223 0.00274
. . (0.00794) (0.00794) (0.00793)
Child in part-time work . . 0.01237 0.01238 0.01334
. . (0.00982) (0.00982) (0.00982)
Child unemployed . . 0.00814 0.00813 0.00833
. . (0.01089) (0.01089) (0.01088)
Constant -0.04970*** -0.04922*** -0.04926*** -0.04927*** -0.05579***
(0.00835) (0.00837) (0.00837) (0.00837) (0.00825)
Wave FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 43193 43193 43193 43193 43193
∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Monetary values are expressed in PPP real values (thousand euros, Germany
2005). Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
43
B Proof of the solution
The log-normal utility function takes the form
U1,yt =
1− e−kc1,yt
k
+ Et
1− e−kc1,ot+1
k
+ αEt
1− e−kw2,yt+1
k
that must be maximized over s1,yt and s
1,o
t+1 subject to the following con-
straints:
c1,yt = y
1,y
t − s1,yt
c1,ot+1 = y
1,o
t+1 + s
1,y
t − s1,ot+1
w2,yt+1 = y
2,y
t+1 + s
1,o
t+1 .
By substituting the constraints into the utility function, we express it in
terms of savings:
U1,yt =
1− e−k(y1,yt −s1,yt )
k
+Et
1− e−k(y1,ot+1+s1,yt −s1,ot+1)
k
+ αEt
1− e−k(y2,yt+1+s1,ot+1)
k
.
Since, in general, Et eax = eaµ−a
2 σ2
2 if x ∼ N (µ, σ2) and in our case y1,ot+1 ∼
N (y¯1,o, σ2 1,o) and y2,yt+1 ∼ N (y¯2,y, σ2 2,y), we can write the utility function as
follows, by exploiting the properties of exponential:
U1,yt =
1− e−k(y1,yt −s1,yt )
k
+
1− e−k(y¯1,o− k2 σ2 1,o+s1,yt −s1,ot+1)
k
+ α
1− e−k(y¯2,y− k2 σ2 2,y+s1,ot+1)
k
.
First order conditions take the form
∂U1,yt
∂s1,yt
= −e−k(y1,yt −s1,yt ) + e−k(y¯1,o− k2σ2 1,o+s1,yt −s1,ot+1) = 0
∂U1,yt
∂s1,ot+1
= −e−k(y¯1,o− k2σ2 1,o+s1,yt −s1,ot+1) + αe−k(y¯2,y− k2σ2 2,y+s1,ot+1) = 0
that can be easily simplified by rearranging terms, taking the logarithm, and
dividing by −k as
y1,yt − s1,yt = y¯1,o −
k
2
σ2 1,o + s1,yt − s1,ot+1
y¯1,o − k
2
σ2 1,o + s1,yt − s1,ot+1 = −
lnα
k
+ y¯2,y − k
2
σ2 2,y + s1,ot+1
that can be solved by isolating s1,yt in the former
s1,yt =
1
2
y1,yt −
1
2
y¯1,o +
k
4
σ2 1,o +
1
2
s1,ot+1
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and replacing it in the latter, getting the solution for saving in t+ 1
s1,ot+1 =
1
3
y1,yt +
1
3
y¯1,o − k
6
σ2 1,o − 2
3
y¯2,y +
k
3
σ2 2,y +
2
3
lnα
k
and replacing back in the former
s1,yt =
2
3
y1,yt −
1
3
y¯1,o +
k
6
σ2 1,o − 1
3
y¯2,y +
k
6
σ2 2,y +
1
3
lnα
k
that is the optimal saving in t. Accordingly, the consumption profile is the
following:
c1,yt = y
1,y
t − s1,yt =
1
3
y1,yt +
1
3
y¯1,o − k
6
σ2 1,o +
1
3
y¯2,y − k
6
σ2 2,y − 1
3
lnα
k
c1,ot+1 = y¯
1,o + s1,yt − s1,ot+1 =
1
3
y1,yt +
1
3
y¯1,o +
k
3
σ2 1,o +
1
3
y¯2,y − k
6
σ2 2,y − 1
3
lnα
k
w2,yt+1 = y¯
2,y + s1,ot+1 =
1
3
y1,yt +
1
3
y¯1,o − k
6
σ2 1,o +
1
3
y¯2,y +
k
3
σ2 2,y +
2
3
lnα
k
that satisfies the constraints that
c1,yt + c
1,o
t+1 + w
2,y
t+1 = y
1,y
t + y¯
1,o + y¯2,y
in expectations.
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